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A key risk for the secondary market of government bonds is illiquidity because it affects the 
issuance strategy of the Treasury. Liquidity condition of the secondary market can be itself 
influenced by the primary market activity, as a loop. Our contribution is to develop a simple 
model that demonstrates how good treasury auctions affect liquidity when market makers are 
heterogeneously informed. With a panel of three lines of emission of BTPs, we explore 
empirically whether, and to what extent, primary market dynamics affect secondary market 
liquidity. Moreover, we infer whether auction’s informativeness can be explained by an 
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The efficiency of the secondary market of a security is crucial for an efficient allocation of 
securities in the primary market, but on the same hand, liquidity of the secondary market itself 
depends on the decision taken by issuer which affects investors’ portfolio choice and, 
consequently, the ease with which a security can trade.  
Market liquidity is the ability to quickly trade large quantities of an asset at a low cost and it is 
thus the key for a good and efficient functioning of financial markets. Market participants and 
policymakers have always put a lot of attention on it.  
When dealing with government securities, this link between primary and secondary markets is 
even more important. If the secondary market of government bonds is not liquid, primary 
dealers, that act as market makers on the secondary market, have more difficulty in trading the 
government securities. Consequently, when they participate at auction, they request a higher 
premium for the higher liquidity risk. This premium is reflected in lower prices, and, 
accordingly, higher yields. If the Treasury issues bonds with higher yields, it faces higher cost 
for the management of public debt. 
The outcome of auctions, the main mean through which governments place their securities on 
the market1, is very important for a sound management of government debt. This outcome 
communicates a lot about the securities, in terms of market sentiment and market participant 
behaviour, especially that of primary dealers, because it gives insight of the state of both the 
economy and the markets. It is a signal of trustworthiness that a government can give to the 
secondary market, in terms of demand received, price of emission and relative yield. 
Indeed, it has been studied that primary market has an important effect on prices and yields 
movement around auctions, i.e. they exploit a cyclic pattern around the auction day.  
However, we do not know how the performance of an auction of a government security impact 
on secondary market liquidity. By studying the informative power that auctions have on 
secondary market liquidity, we contribute to the strand of literature dealing with the interaction 
between primary and secondary market of government bonds. 
To do this, we first develop a model in which we can find two market makers, that buy from 
the primary market and are active on the secondary one, and final investors, those that trade 
with market makers and have no power in determining prices. The novelty is that we assume 
market makers to be uninformed about the total demand bid of a specific security on auction 
day. The total demand can be inferred by the signal perceived by market makers through the 
                                                          
1 Other ways of placing bonds in the market are syndicated loans or private placement. 
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performance of the auction. But these dealers, do not receive the same signal as it is linked to 
the respective individual demand, different for each market maker. The heterogeneity is another 
novelty introduced by our model, as, to my knowledge, no paper assumes market makers of 
government bonds to be privately and heterogeneously informed about the expected value of 
the bond, not perfectly known. Moreover, differently from previous works, we focus the 
attention on the demand received by the Treasury and not on the amount supplied, as it is how 
much the bond is requested that reflects the trust that dealers have on the issuer. 
With this model, we theoretically find that the information coming from the primary market 
affects positively the liquidity condition of the secondary market on auction day, because it 
reduces uncertainty about the fundamental value of the bond. The more precise the information 
received, the tighter the bid-ask spread set by market makers and the bigger the quantity of 
traded bonds on the secondary market with final investors at the new price levels, i.e. larger 
depth.  
Based on our theoretical predictions of our model, we empirically study how the development 
of liquidity on auction day is affected by auction’s results. To this extent, we examine the results 
of Italy’s government bonds’ auctions and the MTS cash market of three selected lines of 
emission, i.e. 3-year, 7-year and 10-year BTPs, in the period from January 2016 to December 
2019. The choice of Italy is linked to its huge stock of debt, whose management is crucial, and 
to MTS Italy, the secondary market of its government securities and the first electronic market 
of Europe. Because of its massive stock of debt, it is very important for the Public Debt 
Management to have a liquid secondary market. To be sure the secondary market of government 
security is efficient, primary dealers are encouraged to guarantee and maintain the market 
liquid. This incentive is satisfied by the ranking of the Public Debt Management of Italy where 
all Specialists (a subset of primary dealers meeting specific criteria2) are scored according to 
the points they gain conditional on their behaviour in both the primary and secondary markets. 
To analyse the impact of the primary market on the secondary one, we retrieved two feasible 
indicators to be used as measures of the performance of auctions from the auction’s results. The 
first one is the bid-to-cover ratio. It is the ratio between aggregate demand of primary dealers 
and amount allotted by the issuer, and it is the metric that has been used the most to explain the 
                                                          
2 To be classified as a Specialist, a primary dealer must meet several requirements as explained in the 
Decree no. 993039 of November the 11th 2011. Among all the criteria, they must participate efficiently 
at the auctions in terms of quality, quantity and continuity, with a minimum allocation higher, or equal, 




performance of an auction. The second one, a novelty with respect to the literature, is the 
overbidding indicator. It is the difference between the allocation price and the midprice of the 
bond on the secondary market five minutes before the auction.  
Our main contributions to the literature regarding the relationship between primary and 
secondary markets consist in demonstrating that liquidity conditions of the secondary market 
are influenced by the outcome of the auction. In fact, there is significant evidence that a good 
auction, in terms of bid-to-cover ratio or high overpricing, affects positively liquidity conditions 
on auctions day. 
Moreover, we find empirical proof that these two measures used for the empirical analysis are 
complementary to each other as one is correlated only to price-related liquidity measures and 
the other one only to quantity-related ones. In addition, the overpricing indicator is more reliant 
that the bid-to-cover ratio during periods characterised by higher volatility. This is true also 
when analysing liquidity on the day after the auction, i.e. the overpricing remains significant 
for the liquidity metrics it affected the previous day. 
Furthermore, market liquidity is studied through several liquidity metrics and not by a unique 
one because we want to emphasize its multidimensional nature and to have a more 
comprehensive approach with respect to previous work. 
This work continues as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to the study. Section 3 
introduces the model and the testable predictions. Section 4 deals with the institutional 
framework of how Italian government securities’ markets work and the main descriptive 

















Recently, treasury auctions have been acquiring more importance in the economic literature.  
First, because the bond market has often been analysed from a corporate point of view. 
Secondly, because auctions are the main method through which sovereign bonds are placed. 
Especially the Italian Treasury, which prefers public auctions when issuing on the domestic 
market (AFME, 2017).  
Theoretically, auctions have been deeply studied through auction theory. According to this, Das 
et al. (1997) explain that the bidding behaviour of primary dealers3 is affected by the auction 
mechanism adopted by the seller. Auction theory distinguish several auction forms, but two of 
them are relevant for Italian sovereign debt issuance program: discriminatory price auction, the 
case of Italian BOTs, where winning bids are filled at the respective bid price, and the uniform-
price auction, as for all other Italian sovereign bonds , where all winning bids are settled at the 
same price equal to the marginal price (the lowest winning price or stop-out price). Depending 
on the auction format, market imperfections can be stronger or weaker, and they may hamper 
the good functioning of the market. One of the most frequently assumed friction is information 
asymmetry between the issuer and the buyers in the primary market because buyers do not 
know the real value of the bond trading on the primary market.  
Information asymmetry in common-value auction model4 takes the name of winner’s curse. 
The rationality behind this is that every dealer bidding at auction, except from the winner, 
estimates the common value to be lower than the value estimated by the winner. According to 
auction theory (Das et al., 1997), the bidding behaviour of Primary Dealers is affected by the 
auction mechanism adopted by the seller. Depending on the auction format, the winner’s curse 
effect can be stronger or weaker. It is stronger, in a discriminatory price auction (Das et al., 
1997) and, thus, the expected bond yields are higher (Cole et al., 2018). While it is less 
significant when adopting a uniform-price auction protocol, since bidders have less bargaining 
power in pressuring the prices down. Buyers, in uniform-price auctions, are consequently less 
willing to acquire information (Cole et al., 2018).  
                                                          
3 Primary dealers are the counterparty that trades with the Government in the primary market. They are 
the link between primary and secondary markets for governments securities. In the last years, the number 
of primary dealers decreased in most European Countries.  
4 Usually, the value model used in analysing treasury auctions is the common-value one, in which the 




The good functioning of the primary market is closely related to the developments of the 
secondary market of government bonds.  In the secondary market, market makers have often 
seen as a homogenous group and liquidity traders, in our case final investors, as those that, 
trading with market makers, can be split between informed and uninformed (Copeland et al., 
1983; Glosten et al., 1985). Market makers’ status of informed traders with respect to other 
market makers has been theoretically studied especially in the field of stocks. Calcagno et al. 
(2006), for instance, study the behaviour of risk neutral market-makers that have private 
information about the fundamental value of the bond to trade and compete with market makers 
who are uninformed. Information in general can have an important role in market 
microstructure. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predict that bid-ask spreads decrease as 
information about fundamental value is incorporated into prices. Ho and Stoll (1981) study the 
behaviour of the specialist in managing his inventory as a monopolist and the effect that its 
management has on the bid-ask spread.  
Empirically, several studies have been conducted on the relationship between primary and 
secondary markets for both government and corporate bonds.  
It has been shown that prices and yields on the secondary market exploits predictable patterns 
around auctions. Lou et al. (2013), Beetsma et al. (2016) and Cafiso (2019) demonstrate that 
this predictable patterns of yields and prices exist. Lou et al. (2013), Beetsma et al. (2016), find 
evidence that sovereign bond yields on the secondary market follow an auction cycle every time 
we are close to an auction, with an amplitude of the cycle in periods of turmoil. US Treasury 
yields of 2-, 5-, 10-year notes experience this pattern also intraday (Fleming et al., 2014). 
Instead, Cafiso (2019), who focuses on the Italian sovereign bond wholesale market by 
analysing data provided by MTS, finds that the Italian sovereign bond yields have this pattern 
high-volatility periods.  
The existence of these predictable patterns of both prices and yields can be explained by various 
factors.  
First of all, the inventory management problem of primary dealers that makes them trading 
before and after auctions is affected by end-investors’ portfolio stickiness (Cafiso, 2019), for 
profit-seeking purposes (Fleming et al., 2007), limited risk-bearing capacity (Lou et al., 2013; 
Beetsma et al., 2016), because of net supply risk, which is the uncertainty related to the fact 
that the Treasury may issue an amount smaller-than-expected, and the gradual disclosure of 
information prior to an auction (Sigaux, 2018), the gradual arrival of buyers in the market 
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(Duffie, 2010)5, the price impact of other traders who sell ahead the sale of the issuer 
(Bessembinder et al., 2016)6, the funding constraints of primary dealers, the characteristics of 
both the auctioned bond and those already traded on the secondary market that are strictly 
correlated to the first one and market conditions (Eisl et al., 2019),  and, finally, by the 
information released by the Treasury (Bikhchandani et al., 1993).  
Secondly, yield movements can be altered by a specific indicator of the result of auctions. 
Beetsma et al. (2018) deal with the importance of the bid-to-cover ratio as proxy of the success 
of an auction, and test case for the creditworthiness of the government, to explain secondary 
market yield movement around auctions. The bid-to-cover ratio has been the only indicator 
used to explain the performance of an auction. For instance, Goldreich (2007) control for it to 
study the effect on underpricing, together with price tail to infer the impact of competition in 
discriminatory auctions. Moreover, it is an important criterion to signal the state of the Treasury 
markets and of the overall economy (Lou et al., 2013). 
This predictable pattern, i.e. the auction cycle, is one of the two issuance cost’s components 
faced by the debt management when issuing new securities. Depending on how a new bond has 
been allocated on the primary market, in terms of yields and prices, another cost can be 
associated to the issuance strategy followed by the Treasury, i.e. the underpricing (Lou et al., 
2013). Underpricing regards the evidence of auction prices lower than contemporaneous market 
mid-quotes. In US Treasury market it is stronger when the protocol of the auction is 
discriminatory (Goldreich, 2007)7 or when there is the possibility for primary dealers to bid-
shade8, especially in uniform price auctions (Hortaçsu et al., 2018).  
Underpricing is an important feature in the framework of corporate bonds, when firms decide 
to go public to fund their growth. As a matter of fact, in an Initial Public Offering, only firms 
with the most favourable prospects find optimal to signal their type by listing their IPO at a 
                                                          
5 Auctions influence the secondary market yield also depending on the number of participants. Duffie 
(2010) explains that if capital constraints of market participants are less severe over time because more 
dealers arrive in the market, yields will be on a decreasing path in the days before the emission of the 
bond. 
6 They don’t deal with the Treasury market directly, but their work relates to trading strategies of market 
participants around large and predictable trades that affect the price pattern of securities traded. 
7 Italian Government bonds (Cafiso, 2019) and others around Europe, e.g. in Spain (Alvarez et al., 2019) 
are not subject to the underpricing phenomenon. 
8 As stated by auction theory, participants in common value auctions, may shade their bids because of 
their risk-averse behaviour regarding the winner’s curse or any other kind of risk. Bid-shading is a matter 
of asymmetric information and market power. 
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price lower than the real value in the stock market, i.e. underpricing. In this way they can signal 
themselves on the stock market as investors, more or less informed, know that only the best 
issuers can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues (Allen et al., 1989). 
Underpricing is, thus, a way for firms to signal and discriminate themselves on the stock market 
(Leland et al., 1977). Consequently, as long as managers are interested in heavily underpricing 
their firm only if they are sure that the firm is going to achieve higher market-adjusted returns, 
a good level of underpricing is a good way to signal the firm on the market. The signalling value 
of IPOs for high-quality firms may increase the demand of investors in the primary market but 
also of other investors trading the activity on the secondary market.  
However, the strategy of the issuer is based also on secondary market conditions, because a 
certain level of liquidity guarantees an efficient allocation of bonds on auction day. Indeed, the 
practice of underpricing, however, is determined by important factors as the expected after-
market liquidity (Corwin et al., 2004; Ellul et al., 2006). Worse liquidity conditions on the 
secondary market leads primary dealers to ask higher risk premia when bidding on the primary 
market, because of the higher liquidity risk perceived by dealers. This translates into lower 
prices and higher yields, that translate into greater costs for the Treasury. 
News announcements are one of the factors that may alter market liquidity. Nguyen et al., 2018, 
study secondary market dynamics, i.e. liquidity, volatility and volume traded, for US Treasury 
securities at intraday frequency in correspondence of macro-announcements. In line with 
Fleming et al. (2014), liquidity is better on auction day before the auction takes place but 
decreases after macro-announcements (among which, auction’s results) are released. Riordan 
et al. (2013) find that stock market intraday liquidity in the Toronto Stock Exchange is 
positively affected by good and neutral news, negatively by bad ones and these are particularly 
informative. 
Liquidity conditions of the secondary market are also reflected by the characteristics of the 
bond issued on auction day (Arseneau et al., 2015; Eisl et al., 2019): amount allocated, maturity, 
price and other information revealed during the book‐building period, in the specific case of an 
Initial Public Offering (Corwin et al., 2004), or on auction day, in the case of government 
securities’ auctions. These decisions are then reflected on the portfolio composition of primary 
dealers. To this extent, Arseneau et al. (2015) identify a liquidity loop between primary and 
secondary market due to the fact that issuers and investors do not internalize how their 
behaviour affects secondary market liquidity when negotiating on the primary market. 
Moreover, they find that secondary market trading frictions, i.e. transaction and information 
costs, hinder the liquidity of assets trading on that market. This illiquidity is then reversed on 
the primary market to the extent that investors ask for a higher liquidity premium when they 
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participate at auctions. Indeed, the price of an asset has a liquidity component related to the 
security traded (Chaumont, 2018). 
Depending on the financial market and on its specific regulation, secondary market liquidity 
may be affected by other features. Greco and Mormando (2018) find that when the Treasury 
changes the Specialists’ Evaluation Criteria9, the liquidity condition in the secondary market 
for BTPs with a residual maturity longer than 10 years. Ferrari et al. (2019) point out that 
secondary market liquidity development of government bonds is also affected by the financial 
constraints of primary dealers. This is confirmed also at a corporate bond level: US corporate 
bonds’ liquidity deteriorates because institutions more constrained by regulations reduce their 
intermediation and trading activities (Adrian et al., 2017). 
Finally, liquidity discovery10 and price discovery of the cash market, i.e. the secondary market 
for Italian government bonds, are influenced by other markets where market makers may trade. 
They might trade on the futures market – the Eurex platform, in the case of Italian Government 
BTPs11 - because of hedging and speculative motives (Eisl et al., 2019). By trading on the 
futures market, investors exert a price pressure on securities trading on the cash market – the 
secondary market for Italian government bonds. According to Pelizzon et al. (2014) a liquidity 
shock in the futures market for BTPs, closely related to the cash one, is transmitted to the market 
where the underlying is trading, i.e. the cash market, through arbitrage, speculation, hedging 
motives and by the market-making obligations of the market makers. 
Furthermore, primary dealers can borrow (“repo”) or sell (“reverse repo”) on the repo market 
government securities to satisfy the demand of end-investors and manage scarcity needs. 
Indeed, if market makers want to trade a specific security that do not own in their inventory, 
they can create short-selling position in the cash market by acquiring that security on the repo 
market (Corradin et al., 2017). Thus, a good functioning of repo market is important for price 
and liquidity discoveries in the cash market.  
                                                          
9 Specialists are primary dealers satisfying specific criteria. Usually at the end of the year, the Treasury 
may modify monitoring and ranking criteria to foster liquidity and efficiency of secondary market. 
Similar mechanisms are adopted also in other European countries. 
10 Liquidity discovery is the adjustment of liquidity conditional on the arrival of new information. 
11 Three are the futures contract available on the Eurex: Short-Term (3-year), Mid-Term (7-year) and 
Long-Term (10-year) Euro-BTPs, that have been introduced on the Eurex Exchange Platform in 2010, 
2011 and 2009 respectively. Only Short-Term and Long-Term Euro BTPs futures contracts are 
effectively traded by market participants. 
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The contribution of this work is manifold. First, theoretically, we contribute to the strand of 
literature related to signals and liquidity conditions, by introducing the novelty of the 
heterogeneity of the government bond market makers with respect to each other, depending on 
their individual demand as, to my knowledge, no paper assumes informed market makers on 
government bond.  
Differently, from what other works assume, in this model the uncertainty is in terms of total 
demand and not in terms of total supply as supposed by Sigaux (2018). So, we shift the focus 
from the Treasury perspective to the market makers perspective, since in our model we have 
that they are the uninformed part of the market. 
Moreover, our work contributes to the literature relating to the relationship between primary 
and secondary treasury market. The novelty of this research is that we link auctions’ 
performance, perceived as a signal of the credibility of the government, to the liquidity 
condition on the secondary market, by using both an already used index, i.e. the bid-to-cover 
ratio and a new one, i.e. the overpricing indicator. 
Finally, it is related to the wider concept of market liquidity and market microstructure as we 
focus on the trading activities at the best quotes of the book, but also of the total book by 



















Introduction to the model 
Market makers’ status of informed trader with respect to other market makers has been 
theoretically studied, especially in the field of stocks. In the government bond market 
framework, the asymmetric information is between the market maker and the Treasury as the 
former do not know the net-total supply issued by the Treasury (Sigaux, 2018).  
On the contrary, in this model, market makers are uninformed with respect to the total demand 
received by the Treasury on auction day. The total demand of the bond received by the Treasury 
is the real value that the bond accrues on auction day. As market makers base their strategy on 
the expected value of the bond, they will know better the distribution of this value only after 
they know their individual demand. The individual demand is known by the market maker only 
after the auction takes place. 
Despite market makers are homogenously informed before the auction, they are 
heterogeneously informed after the emission as they now know their respective demand, which 
is different among dealers. As the market makers do not have the same individual demand since 
they satisfy a different quantity of customers, also their level of information about the total 
demand is not the same. Once received the signal from the auction, based on the individual 
demand, market makers can infer more precisely the distribution of the true value of the bond, 
which is at the basis of their trading strategy. 
 
Set-up 
There are four periods (t = 0, 1, 2, 3, Figure 1), a risky treasury bond which is auctioned in a 
staggered fashion, market makers and final investors. 




( 1 ) 
Where 𝑊𝑡 is the final-period wealth and 𝑎 > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, equal 
for all market makers and i is the subscript indicating market maker i, and i = 1…N.  
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two market makers, but the results of 
the model are the same if we consider a larger number of market makers, with a different 
individual demand each. 
                                                          
12 CARA utility function rules out wealth effects on portfolio choice. Wealth effects could be captured 




















Figure 1 Timeline 
 
As we can see from Figure 1, at t = 0 market makers are endowed with an initial level of wealth 
𝑊013.  
At t = 1, market makers trade the bonds in their inventory with final investors. Prices set on the 
secondary market depend on the real value of the bond, 𝑣. It is unknown, but market makers 
base their expectation of its distribution on that of the prior value, i.e. the value of the bond after 
the previous auction, which is of common knowledge. As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the 
value of the asset is 𝑣1~𝑁 (𝜑,
1
𝜌𝜑
), with 𝜑 the prior value of the asset and 𝜌𝜑 the precision of 
the prior. With the evaluation of the asset, and prices set in accordance to the prior common 
value of the bond, they have the following level of wealth: 
 
                                                          
13 The initial endowment owned by market makers at time 0 is the result of market operations that took 
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( 2 ) 
The amount traded on the secondary market is assumed to depend on final investors’ supply 
and demand function. We assume that final investors are price-taker and they will base their 
trading activity on the price set by market makers. Because of this, in the spirit of Copeland and 





( 3 ) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑎 = 1 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑘 
( 4 ) 
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𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑊1) 
( 6 ) 
 
Where the first term is the mean, the second is the risk-premium and 𝑎 represents the coefficient 




The first order condition at t = 1 is: 
𝐸[𝑣] −  𝑝1
𝑏𝑖𝑑 + 𝑝1
𝑎𝑠𝑘 − 𝐸[𝑣] − 𝑎 ∙ 𝑋1
𝑏𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣) − 𝑎 ∙ 𝑋1
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣) = 0 
( 7 ) 
 
 
                                                          
2 Copeland and Galai (1983) do not use prices directly, but the probability that trades at a certain price 
will be executed. Since prices are assumed to be distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, they can be 





𝐸[𝑣] =  𝜑 
( 8 ) 




( 9 ) 
 













( 10 ) 
 
From which we can retrieve the prices that maximize the utility function and the relative bid-




1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣)
+ 𝑝1
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1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣)
 





1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣)
 
( 13 ) 
 
Prices are equal for both market makers as they trade on the same expected value of the bond, 
i.e. the prior value. 
At t = 2 a shock occurs. The shock consists of a signal 𝜃 coming from the auction on the primary 




 , where 𝜌𝜃 is its precision. The shock coming from the auction is asymmetric as the 
signal hits heterogeneously the two market makers. This heterogeneity depends on the 
individual demand of the market maker, which is not the same for both dealers. 
The difference is in terms of precision, i.e. high or low, although the mean value of 𝜃 is the 
same for the market makers. The variance of 𝜃 will be lower in the case of a high-precision 
signal and higher in case it is less precise. The high-precision signal is received by the market 
maker with bigger individual demand, 𝑀𝑀𝐻, the low-precision one by the market maker with 
14 
 
a smaller market share, 𝑀𝑀𝐿. Therefore, the precision of the signal is directly connected to the 
share of the entire market served. 
At the auction, when market makers discover their individual demand, they know whether they 
bid a big amount of bonds or not, because they compare it to the individual amount bid at the 
previous auction. 
At t = 3 they will update their prior beliefs with the signal received, to base their trading activity 
on the posterior value of the bond. Posteriors of the real value are made up as in Bayesian 
learning, thus the distribution of the posterior value 𝑣 is: 
 
𝑣2~𝑁 (






( 14 ) 
Because of the two signals, the updated distribution of the fundamental value of the bond 



















( 16 ) 
 
Where 𝑣𝐻 and 𝑣𝐿 are the new values of the bond according to 𝑀𝑀𝐻 and 𝑀𝑀𝐿, respectively. As 
the expected value has changed, the strategy of market makers must be updated. Therefore, also 
quotes change with respect to time 1 prices and they will be different between market makers 
as they base their strategy on two different expected value of the bond.  
The third-period level of wealth becomes: 
 





( 17 ) 
 
where the subscript i specifies the market maker, whether of type L or H.  









𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑊3,𝑖|𝜃) 
( 18 ) 
 
where a is always the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and it is the same for both market 
makers, i.e. they are equally risk-averse, despite their heterogeneity. By focusing only on the 
risk premium, we can notice that the higher the variance of the signal, thus the lower the 
precision, the higher the risk premium asked by the dealer on the market. 
Accordingly, also prices that maximize the utility function and the relative bid-ask spread 




𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
+ 𝑝3,𝑖
𝑏𝑖𝑑 




𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
 





𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣| 𝜃)
 
( 21 ) 
Market makers, differently from the previous literature, are not expected to behave as a 
monopolist, though in a competitive framework and without cooperation, thanks to the 
regulatory framework surrounding the market. Indeed, even though quotes are different 
depending on the type of the signal received, we assume there is no strategic interaction between 
the two dealers. 
As we can see form (21), the higher the variance the larger the spread. Lower precision leads 
market maker to ask a higher risk premium, e.g. they increase transaction costs15.  
Larger bid-ask spread indicates worse liquidity condition of the market. This is consistent with 
Stoll (1978) that demonstrates the linear dependence of the bid-ask spread on the risk-aversion 
and on the asset volatility 
After the trading at t = 3 the value of the bond returns to be common knowledge, because less 
informed traders have now acquired all the information provided by the auction and it has been 
consolidated among all market makers. 
 
                                                          




In general, at both time 1 and time 3, the equilibrium prices set by the single market maker can 




( 22 ) 
Such that every market maker i is in balance, i.e. the amount of the security sold at time t is 
the same as that bought from final investors, 
Equation 22 develops as: 
1 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑘 =  𝑝𝑡
𝑏𝑖𝑑 
( 23 ) 
 




𝑎𝑠𝑘 − 2𝑎(1 − 𝑝𝑡,𝑖
𝑎𝑠𝑘)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣) = 0 
( 24 ) 
 




1 + 2𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣)
2(1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣))
 




2(1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣))
 
( 26 ) 
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, market makers set a higher bid-price and a lower ask -price than 
the respective prices before the auction. Moreover, market makers now quote different prices. 






















On the basis of the proof to Proposition 1, we know that at time 3 the variance of the value 
decreases, whatever the quality of the signal received by the market maker at time 2. A lower 
variance leads to a decrease in the uncertainty about the true value of the bond. Because of this, 
at time 3 market makers set a lower ask-price and a higher bid-price with respect to quotes set 









( 30 ) 
 
where i stands for the type of the signal received by the market maker, L if with low precision 
and H if high.  
Being the two market makers heterogenous, they set different prices. As equations (25) and 
(26) exploit, prices linearly depend on the variance of the value, thus on the precision of the 
signal. Therefore, both market makers adjust quotes according to the precision of the 









( 32 ) 
  
Different prices mean that the quantity traded with final investors is not the same, either after 
the auction, by comparing the amount traded before and after the issuance, either between the 
two market makers. Higher ask-prices lead to a decrease in the amount demanded by final 
investors and lower bid-prices denote a lower supply. By following the reasoning in equations 
(29) and (30), at time 3 trades are larger on both sides of the market because of the lower 








( 34 ) 
 
Moreover, because of the relationships in (31) and (32), the two market makers do not trade the 
same amount of bonds with final investors at time 3. The different prices set by market makers 
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make final investors adapt their bid and offered quantities. If market maker’s orders with the 
best prices are filled, final investors trade at the best available price, that can be a second-best 
or worse 16, without waiting for new orders with better quotes. The amount traded for both 









( 36 ) 
 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the signal is more precise for the market maker with 
a bigger number of customers. Indeed, the more precise the signal, the more the amount of 
bonds to trade in both direction of the market, the more, subsequently, the customers to satisfy. 
 
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, liquidity conditions are better after the auction, whatever the 
precision of the information retrieved by the market makers. 
Proof of proposition 2: 














( 37 ) 








( 38 ) 
Where i stands for the type of market maker. 
On the basis of the proof of Proposition 1, receiving the signal lowers the variance of the value, 
whatever the precision of the signal. Consequently,  
We can state that: 
                                                          
16 It could be a price worse than the second-best if there were more than two market makers, each one 








( 39 ) 
as the bid-ask spread can be written in terms of variance of the value (Equation 37), the signal 
contributes to better liquidity conditions on the secondary market at time 3 with respect to 
time 1. 
The same is valid for market depth. 
The level of market depth at time 1 is given by: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ1 =  𝑋1
𝑎 + 𝑋1
𝑏 
( 40 ) 
as the two market makers quote at the same prices. 
At time 3, depth becomes: 








( 41 ) 
Then,  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ3 > 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ1 
( 42 ) 
 
Proposition 3: The extent to which market makers contribute to the liquidity provision depends 
on the precision of the signal. 
As a result of Proposition 1 (Equations 31 and 32) and the proof of Proposition 2 (Equation 37), 






( 43 ) 
 
The broader spread can be explained by the compensation asked by small market maker for the 
bigger volatility of the bond’s expected value. Larger spreads are index of worse liquidity 
conditions of the market. 
The same reasoning applies to the individual depth. As it results from (35) and (36), with the 















( 44 ) 
 
Proposition 4: The less informed market maker earns higher profits. 








( 45 ) 
𝜌𝜃
𝐻 > 𝜌𝜃
𝐿 > 𝜌𝜑 
( 46 ) 
and 





( 47 ) 
 
In equilibrium, with the given demand and supply schedule of final investors, market makers 
do not earn the same profit, even if there are changes on both sides of the market. 
Since we know from Equation (47) that profits depend on the expected value the market maker 
has for the real value of the bond, i.e. 𝐸[𝑣|𝜃], on prices set by market makers, and on quantities 
traded with final investors, a worse signal, with a lower precision as 𝜌𝜃
𝐿, implies higher profits. 
This is due to the higher risk premium requested by the market maker who receives a low-
quality signal. Indeed, as we know from Proposition 2, this market maker, sets a broader bid-
ask spread after the auction, so it benefits from the higher transaction costs and earns a higher 
profit. 
On the other hand, the market maker with the more precise signal earns a lower profit. 
Consequently, market makers do not use their information advantage to make more profits, but 




Institutional framework and dataset 
Functioning of the Primary Market and instruments issued by the Treasury. 
In the primary market, the sovereign issuer, that in Italy is the Minister of Economics and 
Finance (henceforth Treasury, or Italian Treasury), places different type of securities17 
depending on the liquidity needed to finance its spending.  
Depending on the kind of instrument, we can distinguish two different auction protocols: 
competitive yield auction and marginal price auction. The former, that involves BOTs’ 
issuance, is in yield terms and each bid placed by the dealers is awarded at the rate proposed18. 
The latter regards all the other instruments and it is in terms of price and the winning bids are 
all settled at the same price, the lowest winning one, also called stop-out price19. Usually, 
auctions concern on-the-run bonds20, the latest issued bond until a new one is issued and takes 
the place of the old one that obtains the off-the-run status. Off-the-run bonds can be issued as 
well, depending on the liquidity needs of the Treasury and on the market shortage of these 
specific bonds. Sometimes, tranches of off-the-run bonds can be placed on the market together 
with on-the-run ones. In this case, we talk about joint auction. This type of issuance provides 
that the total amount to be auctioned is in terms of total volume within a joint supply range. 
Thus, the minimum and maximum amounts offered must be considered for the two securities 
                                                          
17 Among Italian government bonds we can distinguish 17 segments of emission: 6-, 12-month BOTs, 
24-month CTZ, 3-,5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, 20-, 30-, 50-year BTPs, 5-, 10-, 15-. 30-year BTP€I, CCTeu and the 
retail bond Btp Italia. Every year the Treasury publish a calendar where dealers can find the date of 
interest of the auction process (announcement, issuance and settlement dates).  
18 The maximum numbers of bids that can be placed by a singular bidder are five, with yield differing 
one from the other by one thousandth of one percent. The minimum quantity to be bid is 1.5 million 
euros. The first bids to be allocated are those with the lowest yields. In order to avoid misbehaviour from 
primary dealers in placing the bids in terms of yields, a range from a minimum acceptable yield to a 
maximum one is calculated. For marginal price auction, primary dealers can place at most always 5 bids, 
but the minimum bidding amount is 500,000€ and less than the amount being issued. Prices must vary 
by at least one tick, which is one hundredth. 
19 Concerning our four segments of BTPs, the 10-year maturity is issued at the end of the month and the 
3- and 7-year BTPs at the middle.  
20 The on-the-run bond is usually the most liquid among the bonds with the same maturity. The price 
difference between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries is often referred to as the liquidity premium, 
as the more liquid Treasuries are obtained at a higher cost. 
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together. This choice of the Treasury is adopted when the securities to be issued are perceived 
to be highly requested by the market, but also to be more flexible in the issue distribution21.  
Irrespective of the auction format, the process starts some days before the auction. During these 
days, the debt management office of the Treasury announces the auction in a press statement. 
The announcement for all auctions will be issued three business days prior to the placement 
date. The statement confirms the auction date, the maturity of the bond(s) to be auctioned and 
provides a target range for the volume (the minimum and the maximum amounts offered to the 
market, i.e., a “fork”). The to-be issued bond starts trading before the proper issue, i.e. the “grey 
market”, precisely the day after the announcement has been published.  
On auction date t, primary dealers submit their bids during the pre-announced time window.  
Each primary dealer has at most five bids to place (the quantities and the correspondent prices 
at which they are willing to buy the bond) and they are sent electronically and anonymously to 
the Bank of Italy within 11 a.m. of the auction day. After the Bank of Italy receives all the bids 
from the market makers, a decrypting procedure starts and send the list of bids to the Treasury.  
The results are published as soon as possible after the cut-off of the auction, typically within 
11.30 a.m. In the announcement of the results, the Treasury publishes all relevant information 
of the process. Concerning securities issued through a uniform price auction, we can find the 
ISIN code, the tranche of issuance, the coupon, the issue date, the maturity date, the date of the 
auction, the settlement date, the interval of the amount to be offered, the amount requested and 
the amount allotted, which usually corresponds to the top amount of the range disclosed (full 
allotment), the allotment price and the placement fee22 which has to be scaled down from the 
allotment price in order to know the real bid price, and the bid-to-cover ratio. Settlements take 
place on the second working day after the auction. 
There are two main periods for auctions, one takes place at the middle of the month and 
concerns, regarding medium-long term allocation, 3-, 7-, higher than 10-year BTPs and the 
second one at the end of the month which involves 5- and 10-year BTPs.23 
For a more efficient placement of bonds to properly satisfy the aggregate investor demand and 
cut the borrowing cost, the Public Debt Management meets the Specialists (a subset of primary 
                                                          
21 Ministry of Economics and Finance, Public Debt Report 2017. 
22 The amount of the placement fee depends on the type of security issued. Considering the four BTPs 
object of the analysis, we can find placement fees for 0.15%, 0.25%, 0.30%, 0.35% for the 3-, 5-, 7-, 
10-year maturities, respectively. 
23 The reference is to on-the-run bonds. Off-the-run BTPs can be issued also in slots that do not concern 
their initial maturity. 
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dealers) before the announcement date. These meeting are very important for the Public Debt 
Management as in this way it is more informed about secondary market developments. 
Moreover, there are other informative documents, published by the Treasury, that overcome the 
information asymmetry problem between issuer and dealer. These are, mainly, the Annual 
Calendar (published at the beginning of each year, it contains information about the dates of 
announcement size, issuance/re-opening and settlement of each security), the Guidelines on 
Public Debt Management (yearly documents that provide qualitative and quantitative 
information on the issuance and management of the government securities in the following 
year) and the Quarterly Issuance Program (where information about new bonds to be issued and 
re-openings of on-the-run bonds for the next quarter of the year are released). These documents, 
together with other information such as Public Debt Reports, are available on the website of the 
Italian Treasury. 
 
Specialists’ evaluation criteria 
In order to be classified as a Specialist, and benefit from some privileges24, a primary dealer 
must meet several requirements and accomplishments as outlined in the Decree no. 993039 of 
November the 11th 201125.  
With the aim of being sure about Specialists’ compliance with their obligations, the Italian 
Treasury continuously monitors their behaviour both in the primary and secondary markets. 
The main evaluation criteria give the possibility to Specialists to gain points to better compete 
and be placed at the top of the final ranking. The final purpose of the Treasury is to foster 
demand at auctions, increase secondary market liquidity and receive advice from the Specialist 
on debt management policy issue. The points granted depend on the behaviour of Specialists in 
the primary and secondary markets. Different factors are at the heart of the evaluation: the 
quantity allocated by each bidder at auctions, the measure to which the specialists contribute to 
overpricing and overdemanding, the regularity of participation in all the auctions,, the quality 
                                                          
24 For example, only Government Bond Specialists that took part in the main auction can participate in 
the re-openings of the same bond. The maximum amount offered in the re-opening depends on the type 
of security, i.e. re-openings are equal to 15% of the ordinary issue (10% for BOTs), 30% for medium- 
and long-term bonds if newly issued. 
25 Among all the criteria, they must participate efficiently at the auctions in terms of quality, quantity 
and continuity of bidding, with a minimum allocation higher, or equal, than 3% of the overall amount 
auctioned, considering the characteristics of the subscribed securities. Furthermore, they have secondary 




of bid and ask price proposals on the secondary market and the quantities associated with them, 
the type of bonds and volumes traded with other investors, the number of bonds quoted and the 
number of those traded, the activity in the repo market, the market share in the special 
operations (i.e., exchange transactions and buyback operations), the overall contribution to the 
management of public debt (i.e., advisory and research activity). The most important index (that 
gives 33 out of 100 in 2019) concerns the primary market and it is a quantitative indicator that 
involves the share allocated obtained in the reference period.   
Moreover, to make Specialists more compliant with the regulations, the Treasury makes, at the 
end of each year, a ranking and the top five is made public. 26 
 
MTS Italy 
A more efficient placement of bonds for sovereign issuers, in terms of cost and risk premia 
demanded by investors, is guaranteed by a good functioning of the secondary market, the 
market where primary dealers act as market makers, i.e. they trade to provide liquidity to other 
investors that cannot access the primary market directly. 
MTS is an interdealer platform with a high level of pre and post trade transparency established 
in 1988 by the Italian Treasury. The MTS trading system is quote-driven, electronic limit-order 
interdealer market, in which market makers’ quotes can be hit or lifted by other market 
participants via market orders.  
MTS Italy is a branch of the entire MTS trading system and it is the secondary market where 
Specialists are monitored by the Italian Treasury. It is regulated by the Italian Treasury, the 
Bank of Italy and Consob. Here, there are two types of participants: market makers and market 
takers. The former are primary dealers that act on the basis of the Market Making 
Commitments, which establish the rule that market makers have to provide liquidity 
continuously by quoting two proposals (one for the bid side and one for the ask side) during the 
trading hours. They can place quote anonymously, at least until one of the two counterparties 
settles bilaterally. They issue standing quotes but are not obliged to display the maximum 
quantity they want to bid, but only a non-negative fraction of the quantity they are willing to 
trade. Quotes must be at least of 2 million on both ask- and bid side. The latter act as price 
takers, by hitting or lifting market makers’ quotes by market orders. 
                                                          
26 A placement at the top five of the ranking can signal the Specialist in the financial market as it gives 
a higher reputation (Greco and Mormando, 2018). 
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Finally, MTS Italy is divided into two segments: Cash and Repo. In the former, only Italian 
government debt securities are traded, in the latter we can find also government bonds of 
different Governments and non-government bonds, e.g. Asset-backed securities27. 
If the secondary market is not functioning in an orderly manner and is not liquid as it should 
be, the primary market suffers in terms of placements and buy-back operations carried out by 
the Treasury. If this situation exists, the Italian Treasury, together with the technical assistance 
of both the Bank of Italy and the main Specialists28, can change the debt management and 
issuance choices to improve the overall level of efficiency and ensure a sufficient liquidity and 
breadth of trading in the secondary market. 
 
Dataset  
Two are the datasets employed for the analysis. The first one concerns primary market data, 
and the other the secondary market. Both datasets have been provided by the Italian Ministry 
of Economics and Finance, in the framework of research collaboration between the Ministry, 
MTS Italy and CRIEP.   
The primary market dataset contains all the results of auctions, that is: auction day, settlement 
day, amount bid, offered, and allotted, allotment price, gross yield and fees. All data are 
observed on auction day from January 2016 to December 2019. Auctions’ results are collected 
for all bonds of interest, that is 3-year, 7-year and 10-year BTPs29. We have a total of 128 
auctions, 40 for both the 3-year and the 7-year, 48 for the 10-year bond. All BTPs are described 
in the Appendix. For each BTP it is possible to see the reference ISIN code, the date of issuance, 
as it is the first day from which we select every BTP, the coupon and the maturity date. 
The motivation of choosing these three segments relies on the idea that we want to infer whether 
auctions have an informative power on the liquidity of the benchmark and on two other 
                                                          
27 These two markets are different also in terms of market hours. For the Cash Market, we can find the 
following hours: Pre-Market: 7:30am – 8:00am; Trading Hours: 8:00am – 5:30pm; Market Closed: from 
5:30pm until the next morning. For the Repo Market, instead: Pre-Market: 7:30am – 7:45am; Market 
Open: 7:45am – 6:30pm; General Collateral allocation window: 6:30pm – 6:45pm; Market Closed: 
6:45pm. 
28 As stated in the Specialists Decree: The enrolment of the Candidate Specialist in the List of Specialists 
is dependent upon the satisfaction, during the observation period, of a series of requirements as […] 
Assistance in choosing how to improve the overall efficiency of debt management, also by proposing 
useful contributions to issuance and debt management choices.  
29 All BTPs are identified by an ISIN code and their description is given in the Appendix. 
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maturities that are close to the 10-year one and are on the same part of the yield curve, so that 
we do not have too much dispersion among the maturity of the bonds. 
By choosing these three lines, we do not have to consider different type of auctions30 and they 
are not issued with a joint auction, as it usually happens for longer-term maturity, so we do not 
have problems in discriminating the effect of one bond with respect to another one.  
The secondary market dataset contains trades and quotes from January 2016 to December 2019 
at five-minutes interval from 9:00 until 17:00 of the trading day. We decided to observe these 
8 hours of trading because the trading activity is less significant at the beginning and at the end 
of the trading day. This granularity has been chosen to have more precise daily dynamics of 
liquidity metrics and to observe better the linkage between primary and secondary market31. As 
we considered only on-the-run BTPs, i.e. the most recently issued bonds within the sample, we 
had to use data only for a certain interval for each BTP. This means that we had to use trades 
and quotes for each ISIN, that is for each on-the-run BTP. In order to merge all data, we 
considered a single BTP from the day it was issued to the day before the auction of a new 
bond32.  
The crucial point is to infer if auctions have informative power on the liquidity conditions of 
the secondary market of the specific bond on auction day by looking at two different 
performance indicators. One is the bid-to-cover ratio, already used to predict the yield 
movements around auctions (Beetsma et al., 2018), and the other is the overpricing indicator. 
For the purpose of the analysis, daily averages of liquidity measures from the entire dataset 
have been calculated since we are interested in the daily dynamics of secondary market 
liquidity.  
For our empirical strategy, we first focus on the entire sample period, in a second stage of the 
analysis, we study the effect of our auction indicators in periods of financial turmoil to check if 
their informativeness changes. The choice of the period considered derives from the willingness 
to analyse the secondary market of government bond in recent years and to discover if the 
                                                          
30 All these three securities are issued through uniform price auctions. If we would have wanted to 
consider shorter-term maturities, we would have analysed BOTs, but they are issued through 
discriminatory auctions. 
31 As we will see later, for the computation of the overpricing value, it would have been impossible to 
analyse this measure without having such granular dataset. 
32 We could have added the new bond from its public announcement, but the trading and quoting activity 




informative power of auctions changes during crisis period. The crisis period we are referring 
to is after 29th May 2018, a period characterised by high political uncertainty. We have chosen 
this date as discriminant, because it is the day when financial markets experienced the highest 
turbulence. After May 2018, the liquidity of the secondary market of Italian government 
securities has deteriorated, e.g. the average market value of outstanding bonds has fallen about 
9 per cent and yields recorded a marked rise. This growth replicates the steep increase in risk 
premiums and the CDS, the premium for insolvency risk on Italian government securities, was 
at its highest of the last five years, i.e. after the sovereign debt crisis33. 
 
The bid-to-cover ratio and the new indicator 
Before knowing the impact of a good auction on the liquidity condition of our three segments 
of BTPs, we need an indicator of the performance of the auction to know how to establish 
whether an auction performed well or not. In the literature, the bid-to-cover ratio has been the 
only indicator used to explain the success of an auction.  
Despite its easy comprehension and retrieval34, it is not always a reliable indicator, since it can 
be manipulated by dealers submitting bids. For example, a high bid-to-cover ratio can be the 
result of a high demand coming from the bidders, but this aggregate demand does not consider 
the price at which the market makers are willing to buy that security at auction. If the price is 
too low, the Treasury will never deal with those bids, because it sets up a cut-off price under 
which it is not possible to issue the bond. Thus, the nominator of this ratio could be much higher 
than the denominator because of the low-price bids received. 
Moreover, if the bid-to-cover ratio of two auctions is different, it does not mean that it is because 
the amount of bond demanded changed, whereas it could be because of a change in the amount 
offered by the Treasury. 
In uniform price auctions, the amount of bond placed is not set beforehand. The Italian 
Treasury, indeed, announces in a press release, published some days before the auction, the 
range between a minimum and a maximum amount to be issued. Thus, nobody knows the exact 
amount that is going to be placed on the market. However, it must be said that, most of the 
times, the Treasury issues the top quantity of the range. There are some exceptions in the 
auctions studied for the analysis. For instance, the 10-year BTP, which is the benchmark, had 
three auctions in which the Treasury did not place the maximum amount of the range 
                                                          
33 Bank of Italy, Financial Stability Report, November 2018. 
34 When the Ministry of Economics and Finance publishes the results of auction, it is one of the 
indicators available in the press release, therefore, there is no need to compute it. 
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published.35 The biggest difference between the amount allocated and the maximum of the 
potential offer, was at the end of May 2018, the period when Italy had an important political 
uncertainty and, consequently, experienced a spike in the spread between the 10-year BUND 
and BTP.  
Because of its drawbacks, after several interviews with other market operators, we decided to 
use another indicator, i.e. the overpricing, to explain the goodness of an auction. The reason 
why we adopted the overpricing as an indicator relies on the idea that this measure, differently 
to the bid-to-cover ratio, considers both the primary and the secondary markets in its 
calculation. Indeed, it is the difference between the allocation price net of placement fee and 
the relative fair price of the secondary market of the issued security. The fair price is, in our 
case, proxied by the mid-price of the security 5 minutes before the auction takes place. The 
more a BTP is overpriced relative to its fair price on the secondary market, the more it is 
overvalued. This means that for the Treasury the new emission was good since higher prices 
mean that the cost of issuance is lower as yields are not high. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the bid-to-cover ratio and the overpricing for all the 
three lines of emission and figure 2 and figure 3 the relative development of the indicators 
throughout the sample.36  
On average, bid-to-cover ratios are larger for the 3- and 7- year maturities than for the 10-year 
BTP. This should indicate that 10-year BTP auctions have been worse than the other. But if we 
look at the average amount allotted, the 7-year BTP ranks last. Because of the higher 
denominator, i.e. the amount issued, and the similar nominator, i.e. amount demanded by 
primary dealers, the bid-to-cover ratio of the 7-year BTP is consequently greater than the 10-
year’s one. 
This can be also explained by the fact that, on average, 3-year maturity securities are more 
demanded than the other Treasury bonds. As we can see from figure 2, the worst bid-to-cover 
ratios’ performances had been experienced in auction on 12th April 2017, 13th March 2017, 28th 
November 2019 for 3-,7-, 10-year maturities, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
35 Other episodes of amount allotted lower than the maximum amount of the range offered by the 
Treasury, regard the auctions in May 2017 for the 3-year BTP and May 2016, June and February 2018 
for the 7-year maturity. 
36 As explained before, BTPs are issued in couple, i.e. the 10-year BTP is issued on the same day as the 




  3-year BTP 7-year BTP 10-year BTP 
N. auctions 40 40 48 
Average amount bid 
(mn) 
4281 3792 3791 
Average amount 
allotted (mn) 
2761 2680 2741 
 Mean Min 10th Median 90th Max 
Bid-to-
cover ratio 
3-year 1.58 1.22 1.37 1.56 1.78 1.96 
7-year 1.44 1.25 1.32 1.39 1.67 1.92 
10-year 1.40 1.22 1.28 1.37 1.6 1.82 
Overpricing 
3-year 0.02 -0.006 -0.005 0.015 0.067 0.165 
7-year 0.04 -0.05 -0.0125 0.025 0.11 0.235 
10-year 0.03 -0.19 -0.0585 0.015 0.12 0.48 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of performance indicators of auctions 
Although we can notice that most of the minimum values of bid-to-cover ratios concern 
auctions in 201737, except for the 10-year BTP, we can detect low values also in 2018 (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2 Bid-to-cover ratios throughout the sample 
If we focus on the 2018 turmoil, we can see from Figure 2 that the 10-year BTP, which is the 
benchmark, had not been performing well in that period. Indeed, the bid-to-cover of the end-
                                                          
37 As we Figure 1 shows, we can notice that 10-year BTP’s bid-to-cover performed poorly also at the 
beginning of 2017. We can recall that in that period there was the banks problem concerning Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, Banca di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. 
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of-June auction was 1.26, close to the lowest value of the period analysed (1.22) and in the 10th 
percentile of the bid-to-cover distribution, as the last column of Table 1 demonstrates. 
By looking at the Overprice indicator always in Table 1, we can see that on average, it is around 
2 ticks regarding the 3-year BTP, 4 ticks concerning the 7-year maturity bond and 3 ticks with 
respect to the 10-year benchmark. We can observe that the distribution of the overpricing 
indicator is very different among the three maturities. The 3-year BTP is less dispersed than the 
10-year one as we can infer from the range between the minimum and the maximum of both 
types of security. Indeed, as we can see from Figure 3, we can notice how much more the 10-
year overpricing indicator varies.   
 
 
From Figure 3 we can observe how the overpricing is usually negative, especially in high 
volatility period as May 2018. In other terms, we can also talk about underpricing. As we can 
see from Table 2, the minimum value of the overpricing is negative (-0.19). This means that on 
that auction, the allotment price was 19 ticks lower than the fair price, proxied by the midprice, 
of the secondary market 5 minutes before the auction. This was the worst auction of our sample 
in terms of the overpricing indicator. 
Moreover, Italy hosted government elections in March and was in a period of political 
uncertainty until the second half of May of the same year. The importance of this political 
uncertainty can be perceived also by the BTP-BUND spread, as the spread between the two 
government securities’ yields skyrocketed.  
 
Liquidity measure 
As Scheineder et al. (2016) remark, the bid-ask spread as only liquidity metric is misleading. 
Therefore, we compute different liquidity measures from the limit order book that corresponds. 
In the spirit of Sarr et al. (2002), who stated that liquidity measures can be classified in four 
Figure 3 Overpricing indicator throughout the sample 
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categories, i.e. transaction cost, volume based, equilibrium price-based and market-impact 
measures, and other works concerning liquidity (Greco and Mormando, 2018) we estimate the 
effect of auction’s performance on the following liquidity metrics38: 
Bid-ask Spread (BAit): the difference between the best bid- price and the best ask-price as a 
percentage of the midprice, i.e. the average between these two prices, to consider the fact that 
a given spread would be less costly the higher the prices and it is better for comparison purposes. 
Volume-Weighted Bid-ask Spread (VWBAit): it is calculated as the difference between the 
average of prices on both sides of the book, weighted by the respective quoted quantity and in 
percentage of the midprice. 
Best quoted depth (BDit): average between the depth related to the best bid- and ask-prices.  
Total quoted depth (TDit)
39: average between the depth on the bid and ask side of the book.  
Price impact of 20mm (PIit)
40: the difference between the midprice and the realizable execution 
price of a deal of 20mm. The execution price is calculated as, for a hypothetical execution of 

















Where the difference in absolute terms is between the midprice at time t, where t is now the 
frequency at which we observed the data, i.e. five-minute interval, and the product between the 
price and the related quantity trade at that price, weighted by the target amount chosen, i.e. 20 
million. Both differences are computed on the ask side, to which the a as apex is related, and 
on the bid side, indexed by the apex b, then the mean value is computed to fine the Price impact 
on the book, for bond i. 
Trading Volume (TVit): to see the daily traded amount of each BTP. 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the liquidity metrics used and Figure 3 (a, b) the 
development of the measures throughout the sample. 
 
 
                                                          
38 All liquidity measures are calculated on the 5-minute interval. We then took daily averages.  
39 Both values of depth, i.e. the best and the total one, were analysed on both sides of the book. We thus 
have: best bid-depth, best ask-depth, total bid-depth, total ask-depth. 




  Mean Min 10th Median 90th Max 
Bid-Ask 
Spread 
3-year 0.06 0.014 0.0217 0.042 0.0983 0.97 
7-year 0.11 0.035 0.059 0.089 0.17 1.39 




3-year 0.051 0.02 0.027 0.04 0.08 0.56 
7-year 0.085 0.0337 0.051 0.069 0.1237 0.775 
10-year 0.098 0.05 0.065 0.085 0.133 0.71 
Price 
Impact 
3-year 0.0315 0.008 0.0116 0.0224 0.053 0.48 
7-year 0.0589 0.019 0.0323 0.0467 0.085 0.66 




3-year 33.61 10.088 21.17 32.28 48.43 66.35 
7-year 20.03 7.66 14.776 1961 26.45 32.74 




3-year 122.74 51.17 100.76 124.85 142.92 166.55 
7-year 105.2 49.76 89.83 104.81 124.91 143.79 
10-year 95.63 44.32 80.61 96.95 110.88 137.71 
Trading 
Volume 
3-year 70.8 0 0 42 174.35 795 
7-year 58.13 0 0 35 128 574 
10-year 56.16 0 2 34 138.35 610.5 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of liquidity metrics 
 
As we can see from Table 2, on average the liquidity conditions have been better for 3-year 
BTP and worst for the 10-year maturity segment. This is because the 10-year BTP is more 
vulnerable to market conditions. Indeed, as we can see from Figure 4 (a), the 10-year BTP 
segment, performed a huge increase in the bid-ask spread (BA), the volume-weighted bid-ask 
spread (VWBA) and the price impact (PI) during the crisis of May-June 2018 and a significant 
one in September 2019. Both events are linked to the political uncertainty in Italy. A second 
reason is linked to the different level of risk (i.e. measured in terms of duration) a 10-year bond 
has with respect the bonds with shorter maturities.  
The level of depth at the best available quotes is important to analyse, especially the minimum 
values. As we can see from Table 2, the average depth traded on the best quotes, it is slightly 
bigger than 5 (5.63) for the 10-year BTP. This means that, since market makers have the 
obligation to quote at least 5 million on each side of the market, there is certainly only one 
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market maker trading at the best prices. The minimum best depth (BD) of the 10-year BTP is 
not related to 2018 crisis, but as Figure 4 (b) illustrates, it is in September 2019, even though 
the level of spread is tighter in that period than in May 2018.41 We can come to the same 
conclusion by looking at the depth of the 7-year. If we focus on the 3-year BTP, we can notice 
that there could be another market maker trading at the best available quotes since the average 
value at the best available prices is higher than 10 (10.088). 
As we can see from the trading volume statistics in Table 2, the minimum value is zero. Indeed, 
as the last row of Figure 4 (b) proves, along the timeline analysed, no BTPs were traded between 
May and June 2018. 
 
 
Figure 4 (a) Liquidity throughout the sample. The figure shows the dynamics of the bid-ask spread 
(BA), the volume-weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA) and the price impact of a 20 mn deal (PI). 
 
                                                          
41 This may be because market makers in 2019 were more competitive than in 2018 and less were those 




 Figure 4 (b) Liquidity throughout the sample. The figure shows the dynamics of the depth at the best available 
quotes (BD), the total depth of the book (TD) and the trading volume (TV). 
 
Liquidity and auctions 
As we saw before in Section 2 (Related Literature), several studies have been conducted on the 
behaviour of prices and yields around auctions (Cafiso, 2019; Lou et al., 2013). It has been 
shown that they follow the so called “auction cycle”, i.e. prices start decreasing some days 
before the auction and increase thereafter, viceversa for the yield movement.  
We decided to investigate whether liquidity follow a specific pattern around auctions. We 
aggregated all liquidity measures studied in the sample by selecting the snapshots on a 9-day 
window42 where the midpoint is the auction day, and then we took the average. By comparing 
the liquidity metrics in levels, we can conclude that, for all three lines of emission studied, also 
the liquidity follows a specific pattern around auction. As we can deduct from figures 5, 
showing the liquidity path around auctions, we can see that in the 9-day time window liquidity 
conditions get better around auction day, when market makers receive the information about 
the auction, e.g. range of the allotment size.  In general, we can see from figures 5 that on 
auction day liquidity conditions are better than 3 days before, with the exception of the depth 
at the best available quotes (Figures 5, f, g, h). The liquidity metric that follows the most the 
                                                          
42 The width of the window is good to analyse the pattern of liquidity around auctions because we avoid 
overlaps between two consecutive auctions. 
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auction cycle as prices and the changes in yields is the trading volume (figure 5, n). The trading 
activity is indeed focused on the auction day, as market maker manage their inventories on the 
secondary market the same day of the auction.  
In other cases, liquidity gets worse. Specifically, the best depth of the book (figure 5 f, g, h). 
These measures, after the disclosure of some information regarding the auction size, decline. If 
we link this fact by the tightening of the bid-ask spread in Figure 5 (a), it means that there are 
less market makers quoting at the new prices that are morecompetitive than some days before 



















































































Figure 5-m Development of total depth (bid-side) around auctions 











 Before  After  




Price impact (bid-side) 0.054 0.051 
Price impact (ask-side) 0.0532 0.05 
Price impact 0.0535 0.0505 
Best depth (bid-side) 22.2809 20.295 
Best depth (ask-side) 23.2348 23.2053 
Best depth 22.7578 21.7502 
Total depth (bid-side) 107.3287 106.9389 
Total depth (ask-side) 108.1051 108.9058 
Total depth 107.7169 107.9224 
Trading volumes 62.7382 58.6683 
Table 3 Average values of liquidity metrics before and after the auction in a 9-day time window. The values 
before the auction are averages of the 4 days before the auction. The values after the auction are averages of the 4 
days next to the auction. 
The pattern around auctions is also confirmed by the values in Table 3. Table 3 shows the 
average values in the four days before and after the auction day. In general, we can confirm 
what we said in the description of the figures. We can see better liquidity conditions after the 
auction than before the emission: price-related liquidity measures are lower and the total depth 
is greater. Indeed the bid-ask spread decreases, on average 0,6 ticks in the four days after the 
auction. The volume weighted bid-ask spread decreases less  (0,2 ticks), but the effect is also 
on the entire book. Also the decrease in the price impact is not too much (0,3 ticks on both the 
bid- and ask-side) The exceptions concern depth at the best quotes which decreases, on average, 





To infer if the liquidity on auction day is affected by the emission and if the performance of 
auctions has an informative power on market sentiments and liquidity conditions of the 
secondary market treasury bond, we perform several OLS regressions with individual fixed 
effects by controlling for the two performance indicators of an auction. 
 
Baseline regression 
For a given panel of BTPs consisting of bonds of 3-, 7- and 10-year maturity, we estimate the 
following linear model, as baseline: 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑖(𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝐶𝑡
𝑖) +  𝛽2(𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛾𝑚𝑋𝑚) + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑡 
( 48 ) 
Where 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is the liquidity metric for bond with maturity i at day t, 𝐴𝑈𝐶 is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if auction of bond i takes place at day t, 𝛼0 is the constant term, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
specify the effect of the different indicators used to establish the goodness of the auction. 𝐵𝐶𝑡
𝑖is 
the bid-to-cover ratio of the auction occurred and 𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑖 the overpricing indicator for bond i. 𝑎𝑖 
is bond fixed effect. Moreover, we control for market conditions, 𝑋𝑚, where m stands for the 
specific market variable, whose effect is described by 𝛾𝑚. Three are the variables used to 
explain market conditions 𝑋𝑚. First, in the spirit of Pelizzon et al. (2014), the spread between 
the 3-month Euro Area Inter-Bank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) and the 3-month Euro OverNight 
Index Average (EONIA) to control for funding liquidity risk43 expressed by the variable FRISK. 
Secondly, we control for sovereign risk, computed from the first difference of the 5-year CDS 
spread for Italy. And finally, we control for the futures market44 prices development with the 
first difference of prices of the 10-year BTP futures, the most liquid future. 
                                                          
43 It is the risk for a market maker, or a dealer in general, of not having enough resources to fund its 
purchases, is a threaten to liquidity condition of the secondary market. Without the possibility to finance 
its activity, the market maker has no ability to guarantee immediacy to the market (Drehmann et al. 
2009). 
44 The reason why the future market is added to the regression is because it affects secondary market 
efficiency (Pelizzon et al., 2016). BTP futures are traded on the Eurex Exchange that, differently from 
the MTS Cash market, is an order driven market and transactions derive from the interaction of 
participating dealers’ orders. The underlying bonds of these futures are BTPs issued by the Italian 
Government and three are the futures contracts available on the platform: Short-Term, Mid-Term and 
43 
 
We assume 𝑡 to be uncorrelated with the predictor variables. As Eisl et al. (2018) pointed out, 
this assumption may seem restrictive, because, in general, trading volumes, one of our liquidity 
measures, can be endogenous to economic conditions.  
What we expect is that if an auction has informative power, the stronger it is, thus the higher 
the indicators, i.e. bid-to-cover ratio and overpricing indicator, the better the liquidity condition 
on the secondary market. Furthermore, we expect that risk, in terms of funding liquidity and 
sovereign risks, affects negatively secondary market liquidity. Finally, as futures market and 
cash market are closely related, and as the first causes price discovery on the latter (Pelizzon et 
al. 2014), we might see that a wider daily change in futures prices, that can be reconducted to 
an increase in volatility of the futures market, might affect negatively liquidity condition of the 
secondary cash market, as higher spikes in volatility are reflected in spikes in volatility of the 
secondary market (Panzarino et al., 2016). 
In general, the informative power of auctions is significant on liquidity metrics on auction day 
as we can see from Table 4, but it is not homogeneous among all liquidity measures. As a matter 
of fact, on one hand, the bid-to-cover ratio, our first performance indicator, has a significant 
effect on liquidity metrics concerning quantities, i.e. those related to depth and to the trading 
volumes. On the other hand, the overpricing indicator (OP) has a significant effect on liquidity 
measures related to prices. This is in line with how the two indicators are formed: the bid-to-
cover ratio is function of quantities, i.e. it is the ratio between amount bid and amount allotted, 
and the overpricing exploits the difference between the allocation price net of placement fees 
and the mid-price 5 minutes before the auction.  
Table 4 (a) shows that an increase in overpricing is estimated to have a significant negative 
effect on the bid-ask spread (BA) and on its volume-weighted measure (VWBA) that capture 
the entire quoting book. If the overpricing increases by one, the bid-ask spread, on auction day, 
decreases by 0,33 basis points. If we think about a change in the overpricing indicator as a tenth 
of a tick, i.e. a thousandth, the change in the bid-ask spread after the auction is less than a 
                                                          
Long-Term Euro-BTPs, that have been introduced on the Eurex Exchange Platform in 2010, 2011 and 
2009 respectively. Only Short-Term and Long-Term Euro BTPs futures contracts are effectively traded 
by market participants. For the analysis we consider only the long-term segment as it is most liquid and 
the one related to the benchmark. 
At the beginning, the BTP futures market wasn’t very liquid, but once the trading activity increased, the 
linkage between this market and MTS Cash market has become stronger. Indeed, price discovery on the 
secondary market is facilitated by the efficiency of the future market, since futures are objects of trading 




thousandth. This is in line with Figure 4 (a), where we could see that the bid-ask spread (BA) 
decreases, on average, on auction day.  
 
Baseline Regression (a) 
 BA VWBA PI-bid PI-ask PI 
BC 0.06  0.02  0.022  0.025  0.023  
OP -0.33 *** -0.15 ** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** 
FRISK 0.58 * 0.37 * 0.34 ** 0.2 ** 0.33 ** 
CDS 0.05 ** 0.05 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
IK1 0.0034 *** 0.03 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 
 
Baseline Regression (b) 
 BD-bid BD-ask BD 
BC 9.51 *** 8.17  9.14 *** 




** -8.49  -27  
CDS -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** 
IK1 -1.1 ** -2.5 * -1.5 ** 
 
Baseline Regression (c) 
 TD-bid TD-ask TD TV 
BC 31,8 *** 35,2 *** 33,5 *** 149.3 *** 
OP -36,3  -29,5  -32,8  29.88  
FRISK -114 * -156 * -135 ** -478.61  
CDS -0,2 *** -0,2 *** -0,2 *** -0.99 *** 
IK1 -0,63  -0,65  -0,64  -38.9 *** 
Table 4 Baseline regression. The table shows the coefficients of OLS estimation with individual fixed effects of 
the baseline regression. The causal effect of the auction performance and of market conditions is estimated on 
fourteen liquidity measures: best bid-ask spread (BA), volume weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA), price impact of 
a deal of 20 million on the bid side (PI-bid), on the ask side (PI-ask) an on the total quoting book (PI), the best 
depth on the bid side of the market (BD-bid), on the ask side (BD-ask) and on their average (BD), on the depth of 
the total quoting book on the bid side (TD-bid), on the ask side (TD-ask) and on their average (TD), on the market 
trading volume (TV). The P-value of the F-test rejects always the null hypothesis that coefficients are not 
significant. * marks significance at 10%, ** marks significance at 5%, *** marks significance at 1%. 
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The same association is not confirmed with the volume-weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA). As 
we could see in figure 5 (b), the path of VWBA around auction day may be influenced by the 
fact that not all market makers compete in tightening the spread. Moreover, the extreme impact 
of other market conditions during the crisis can hamper the liquidity condition of the entire 
book. Indeed, as we could see from the overpricing graph (figure 3), the indicator steeply 
decreased in correspondence to the 15 days after the crisis at the end of May 2018. The negative 
overpricing has such a strong impact that make VWBA increase, on average, on auction day. 
This means that the crisis might affect the competition among market makers in tightening the 
spread more than during periods of no turmoil.  
Table 4 (a) shows that on auction day also the price impact on the bid side (PI-bid) decreases 
in response to a good auction performance. If a good auction has a high overpricing, then the 
impact on prices of a bid order of 20 million is lower. On the same hand, this happens on the 
ask side (PI-ask). Therefore, we expect that the overall effect of a good auction on the total 
price impact (PI) is the same and this is what we found by regressing it on all our predictors.45 
When the predicted variables are the liquidity measures related to quantities, the effect of the 
auction is still significant, but the indicator that has more importance is the bid-to-cover ratio. 
As Table 4 (b) illustrates, a change in the bid-to-cover ratio (BC) leads to an increase in depth 
if we consider the quantities related to the best quotes of the book (BD-bid and BD-ask, with 
strong and relatively low significance). The positive effect on both sides of the market is 
expected to be the same on the whole market at the best available quotes. Indeed, looking at the 
best quotes of the book (BD), we find that the effect remains significantly positive at the 5% 
level of confidence. Always significant, but stronger, is the outcome that the bid-to-cover ratio 
has on the whole trading book (Table 4, c). On the bid side (TD-bid), a unitary increase of the 
bid-to-cover ratio leads to an increase of more than 30 million of BTPs bought by market 
makers. On the ask side of the book depth (TD-ask), it still has a significantly positive impact, 
thus we expect that, on average, the total impact of an auction with a higher bid-to-cover ratio 
is significantly positive on the total book, as we can see from the third column of Table 4 (c).  
However, this is not in line with what we could see in figure 5 (g, h, i, m). On auction day, 
depth, both at the best quotes and of the total book, is worse than the day before. This effect 
                                                          
45 In terms of magnitude this effect is less strong than on the bid-ask spread (BA). The reason of this is 
always linked by the degree of competitiveness among market makers. Since it is difficult to find an 
order of 20 mn at the best quotes, the impact of the auction is spread among market makers that quote 




could be justified by the fact that the best depth is in function of the best prices of the quoted 
prices. As far as the bid-ask spread is tighter on auction day, I expect that the associated depth, 
i.e. best depth, is lower since only some market makers trade at a tighter the bid-ask spread.  
Always in Table 4 (c), the positive impact of the bid-to-cover ratio (BC) remains significantly 
positive on the trading volumes (TV). If the indicator increases by one, market trading volumes 
steeply increase on auction day, as figure 5 (n) illustrates. This is in line with the inventory 
management of market makers, as they manage their inventories on the secondary market the 
same day of the auction. 
As we can see from all baseline regressions, market conditions are important on auction day, 
especially the CDS, which has always a significant and adverse impact on the liquidity of the 
cash market for 3-, 7- and 10-year BTPs. Moreover, as expected, we can observe from the tables 
that also the funding liquidity risk has a significant negative impact on the liquidity condition 
of the market, as the lower the likelihood for a market maker to provide immediacy, because of 
the higher cost of funding, the lower the provision of liquidity in the market. The same negative 
effect is related to the impact of daily price changes of Long-term BTP futures. The exception 
is on the buy side of the market, since a higher change increases positively the buying pressure 
of the on-the-run BTPs. 
In general, we find empirical support for our model implications on liquidity conditions of the 
market after the auction. The information that market makers receive from the auction events, 
i.e. auction’s performance indicators, have an impact on liquidity. Specifically, a good auction 
has a positive effect on both the bid-ask spread and the level of depth with respect to the day 
before the main event (Proposition 2). 
Furthermore, as we can see from the effect of the overpricing on BA and VWBA, because of 
how they are built46, we can conclude that market makers contribute to the liquidity provision 
heterogeneously and quote at different prices (Proposition 1) as not all of them compete in 
reducing prices. The same rationale applies to the level of depth associated to the best quotes 




                                                          
46 Recall: the bid-ask spread (BA) relates to the best quotes of the book at time t, the volume-weighted 




Persistence on next-day liquidity 
As the baseline specification shows that auctions have an important effect on liquidity on 
auction day, we want to infer whether the effect is persistent on next-day liquidity conditions. 
We thus regress each after-auction day liquidity metric on the performance indicators to know 
whether there is persistency in the informative power of the auction.  
Over prices, as Table 5 (a) shows, liquidity metrics are still affected by the overpricing, even if 
with less significance than on auction day. Instead, looking at Table 5 (b, c), depth and market 
volume are no longer affected by the bid-to-cover ratio is no longer significant. This leads to 
the conclusion that auctions have still an effect on liquidity in the day after the emission and 
that the overpricing has a more persistent impact than the bid-to-cover ratio. 
 
Panel estimates on next-day liquidity (a) 
 BA VWBA PI-bid PI-ask PI 
BC 0,03  0,02  0,001  0,001  0,001  
OP -0,28 ** -0,12 * -0,11 ** -0,12 * -0,11 ** 
FRISK 0.55 *** 0,3 *** 0,34 *** 0,32 *** 0,33 *** 
CDS 0,001 *** 0,0004 *** 0,0004 *** 0,004 *** 0,0004 *** 
IK1 0,004  0,001  0,001  0,001  0,001  
 
Panel estimates on next-day liquidity (b) 
 BD-bid BD-ask BD 
BC -0.63  -0.42  -0.53  
OP -0.43  1.72  1.08  
FRISK -38.8 *** -21.2 *** -30.1 *** 
CDS -0,1 *** -0,11 *** -0,09 *** 








Panel estimates on next-day liquidity (c) 
 TD-bid TD-ask TD TV 
BC 0.46  1.38  0.93  4.03  
OP -15.1  -11.8  -13.4  -38.83  
FRISK -71.5 *** -80.6 *** -76.1 *** -96.33 * 
CDS -0,18 *** -0,22 *** -0,21 *** -0.21 *** 
IK1 -0,51 *** -0,76 *** -0,63 *** -1.44  
Table 5 Panel estimates on next-day liquidity. The table shows the coefficients of OLS estimation with individual 
fixed effects and clusterd standard errors. The causal effect of the auction performance and of market conditions 
is estimated on fourteen liquidity measures on the day after the auction: best bid-ask spread (BA), volume weighted 
bid-ask spread (VWBA), price impact of a deal of 20 million on the bid side (PI-bid), on the ask side (PI-ask) an 
on the total quoting book (PI), the best depth on the bid side of the market (BD-bid), on the ask side (BD-ask) and 
on their average (BD), on the depth of the total quoting book on the bid side (TD-bid), on the ask side (TD-ask) 
and on their average (TD), on the trading volume of the market (TV). The P-value of the F-test rejects always the 
null hypothesis that coefficients are not significant. * marks significance at 10%, ** marks significance at 5%, *** 
marks significance at 1%. 
 
The role of the crisis 
The results in Table 4 (a, b, c) could potentially be influenced by special market events that 
may hamper secondary market liquidity and change the degree of informativeness of the 
performance of the auction. We thus control for market events, by splitting the sample periods 
in two subsamples, one that goes from January 2016 to May 2018 (before the peak of the 
political uncertainty due to the new formation of the Government) and the other from May 2018 
to December 2019.  
The regression we estimate is the following:  
 









+ (1 − 𝐶)(𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑖(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑚𝑋𝑚)) + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑡 
( 49 ) 
  
Where C is a dummy that let us discriminates between the effect of auctions during the crisis 
period, it is 1 for the pre-crisis period, 0 otherwise.  
Table 6 shows the main results of this extended specification. After May 2018, as we can see 
from figure 3, overpricing has become more volatile and higher in absolute values than before 
49 
 
the crisis, thus its effect may be more important in periods of higher volatility also on other 
liquidity metrics. 
Previous works (Pelizzon et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2018) have shown that liquidity of 
government bond secondary market is affected by volatility. The occurrence of a crisis 
manifests itself during period of high volatility. Since Beetsma et al. (2018) have shown that 
the bid-to-cover ratio has a stronger effect in explaining yield movements during periods of 
crisis, we expect that the effect of auction’s performance indicators is sounder during periods 
characterised by stronger turmoil. 
As expected, we can observe from Table 6 (a) that the positive effect on liquidity changes due 
to overpricing on auction day is exclusively confined to the crisis period. The same is true for 
the bid-to-cover indicator, with the difference that effect is now negative on some predicted 
liquidity measures. As we can see from Table 6 (c), the total quoting book (TD-bid, TD-ask 
and TD) now decreases on auction day if an auction performs better during periods 
characterised by higher volatility. The same is true for the market volume. Table 6 (c) shows  
also that an increase in the bid-to-cover ratio decreases the volume significantly and with a 
significant impact. Moreover, the market volume is affected also by how much the issued bond 
is overpriced on auction day. Indeed, an increase by 1 of overpricing, during periods of turmoil, 
has a positive and significant effect on the market volume (TV) which increases by 370.24 with 
95% confidence.47 Overall, in line with Beetsma et al. (2018) the success of an auction provides 
a stronger signal, but only in periods characterised by higher uncertainty. 
 
Pre and Post Crisis Effects (a) 
 BA VWBA PI -bid PI -ask PI 
BC-pre 0.05  0.011  0.013  0.014  0.014  
OP-pre -0.09  0.024  -0.023  -0.03  -0.02  
BC-post 0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.011  




                                                          
47 The positive relationship between TV and OP is also confirmed by the data. On the days after 29th 
May, the first auction of the 10-year BTP resulted in a negative overpricing, i.e. underpricing. This 
strong decrease turned the Trading volume to 0 (Figure 4 (b), last panel).   
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Pre and Post Crisis Effects (b) 
 BD-bid BD-ask BD 
BC-pre 3.58  4.16  3.58  
OP-pre -32.7  -30.15  -31.6  
BC-post 4.37 * 4.6 ** 4.46 ** 
OP-post 0.14  9.2  4.67  
 
Pre and Post Crisis Effects (c) 
 TD-bid TD-ask TD TV 
BC-pre 6.05  8.14  7.11  -106.6  
OP-pre -31.6  -18.6  -25.1  591.54  
BC-post -11 * -14.1 ** -15.55 * -345.8 *** 
OP-post 3.5  15.66  9.57  370.24 ** 
Table 6 Pre and Post Crisis Effects. The table shows the coefficients of OLS estimation with individual fixed 
effects as in the baseline regression, by discriminating between crisis and non-crisis period as defined in equation 
47. The causal effect of the auction performance and of market conditions, not reported in the tables, is estimated 
on fourteen liquidity measures: best bid-ask spread (BA), volume weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA), price impact 
of a deal of 20 million on the bid side (PI-bid), on the ask side (PI-ask) an on the total quoting book (PI), the best 
depth on the bid side of the market (BD-bid), on the ask side (BD-ask) and on their average (BD), on the depth of 
the total quoting book on the bid side (TD-bid), on the ask side (TD-ask) and on their average (TD), on the trading 
volume of the entire market (TV). The P-value of the F-test rejects always the null hypothesis that coefficients are 
not significant. * marks significance at 10%, ** marks significance at 5%, *** marks significance at 1%. 
 
Spillover effects 
We now explore a further extension of the baseline regression to investigate the existence of 
spillover effects across maturities. Thus, we add the same auctions’ indicators of the other bonds 
with different maturities. 
We have now a panel of the three BTPs where the liquidity conditions can be influenced by the 
auction’s results of bonds with different maturities. The model now becomes: 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑖(𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑖) + 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑛(𝛾1𝐵𝐶𝑡
𝑛 +  𝛾2𝑂𝑃𝑡




𝑏) + 𝐴𝑈𝐶(𝜌𝑚𝑋𝑚)+ 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑡 





𝑖 is a dummy equal to 1 if a bond with maturity i is issued on day t. β1 and β2 
specify, as before, the effect of auction’s indicator related to the bond subject of the panel, with 
maturity i. 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑛 is a dummy equal to 1 if a bond with maturity n is issued on day t and γ1 and 
γ2 are the coefficients of the indicators of bond with maturity n. 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑡
𝑏 is a dummy equal to 1 
if a bond with maturity b is issued on day t and δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients of its auction’s 
performance indicators. Market conditions are considered whenever there is an auction. 
Since we have only one auction at the end of the month, it is fair to expect that the effect of the 
3-year or the 7-year, issued together at the middle of the month, is more pronounced than the 
10-year maturity, at least in absolute terms.  
As we can see from Table 7 (a), we can notice that the overall change in liquidity metrics 
concerning prices are driven by the 3-year and 10-year auctions’ performance indicators, but as 
expected, it is mostly determined by the 3-year BTP. Despite the overall positive effect of a 
good auction on secondary market liquidity on auction day (Baseline regression, table 4), 
confirmed by the overpricing indicator of the benchmark (OP10), the 3-year BTP auction has a 
negative spillover effect. If the auction of the benchmark performed well, its goodness spills 
over the other bonds’ liquidity conditions positively. In contrast, if a 3-year BTP is overpriced 
when it is auctioned, it impacts negatively on price-related liquidity metrics of the 7-year BTP, 
issued on the same day, and of the 10-year benchmark. 
Table 7 (b) demonstrates that quantity-related liquidity metrics are always driven by the bid-to-
cover ratio. From the best depth on the bid-side (BD-bid), we can see that only the benchmark 
affects positively the best quoted quantities on the bid-side of the market. On the ask side (BD-
ask) and on average (BD), rather, all BTPs spill over each other positively, with different 
degrees of significance. The most important spillover effect is given by the 10-year benchmark.   
By looking at all the quoted quantities, on both the bid and ask sides (TD-bid and TD-ask, Table 
7, c), no BTP spills over the other, as if each market maker follows its own strategy without 
looking at the results of the auction of the other BTP. Only the 3-year BTP has a slightly 
significant effect on the total ask depth of the 7- and 10-year BTP. 
Table 7 (c) demonstrates also that the spillover effects are confined to the 3- and 7-year security 
when dealing with market trading volume. The 10-year BTP bid-to-cover ratio has no spill over 
effects on the market volume of the other two securities. Its market volume is instead positively 
and significantly affected by how the other two securities performed at auction. The impact of 
the 3-year BTP is less strong than the 7-year maturity.  
The overall effect may be more balanced if we would have included also the 5-year BTP. In 
this way, we would have had 2 auctions also at the end of the month, as the 5-year BTP is issued 
on the same day as the 10-year one. 
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Panel estimates of spillover effects (a) 
 BA VWBA PI-bid PI-ask PI 
BC3 -0.04  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  
OP3 0.84 *** 0.49 *** 0.4 *** 0.4 *** 0.4 *** 
BC7 0.01  -0.008  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
OP7 -0.33 * -0.18 * -0.14  -0.14  -0.14  
BC10 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
OP10 -0.3 *** -0.16 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 *** 
 
Panel estimates of spillover effects (b) 
 BD-bid BD-ask BD 
BC3 1.42  4.65 ** 3.03 ** 
OP3 -3.41  0.63  -1.39  
BC7 1.59  6.2 * 3.89 ** 
OP7 -7.49  -19.3  -13.4  
BC10 1.73 * 6.36 ** 4.04 *** 
OP10 0.25  -6.55  -3.14  
 
Panel estimates of spillover effects (c) 
 TD-bid TD-ask TD TV 
BC3 11.02  12.57 * 11.8  92.42 * 
OP3 -96.25  -90.37  -93.31  -213.6  
BC7 9.39  13.67  11.53  116.84 ** 
OP7 21.55  -8.44  6.55  -299.07  
BC10 8.66  11.31  9.98  -79.94  
OP10 1.59  -3.51  -0.96  282.1  
Table 7 Panel estimates of spillover effects. The table shows the coefficients of OLS estimation with individual 
fixed effects as defined in equation 48. The causal effect of the auction performance of the main BTP and of the 
other BTPs is estimated on fourteen liquidity measures: best bid-ask spread (BA), volume weighted bid-ask spread 
(VWBA), price impact of a deal of 20 million on the bid side (PI-bid), on the ask side (PI-ask) an on the total 
quoting book (PI), the best depth on the bid side of the market (BD-bid), on the ask side (BD-ask) and on their 
average (BD), on the depth of the total quoting book on the bid side (TD-bid), on the ask side (TD-ask) and on 
their average (TD), on the market trading volume (TV). Market conditions are not displayed in the table. The P-
value of the F-test rejects always the null hypothesis that coefficients are not significant. * marks significance at 




We check the robustness of these results by controlling for risk aversion and aggregate 
uncertainty. The variable added to the baseline specification is the VSTOXX, the implied 
volatility of EUROSTOXX 50 index options.  
In this robustness check, we can detect that the performance indicators of auctions have always 
the same significant impact on liquidity conditions of the market on auction day. Table 8 (a, b, 
c) shows that the extended specification leads to similar results as the baseline regression. As 
we can observe in table 8 (a), the overpricing indicator remains statistically significant on all 
liquidity metrics concerning prices and, as table 8 (b, c) confirm, the bid-to-cover ratio has a 
significant impact on those related to quantities.  
Thus, controlling also for market uncertainty (VSTOXX), even though it affects with 
significance other market liquidity metrics, does not affect the significance of all the other 
predictors. 
 
Robustness estimates with VSTOXX (a) 
 BA VWBA PI-bid PI-ask PI 
BC 0.05  0.002  0.0015  0.002  0.02  
OP -0.34 *** -0.1 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** 
FRISK 0.65 ** 0.33 *** 0.31 ** 0.4 ** 0.4 ** 
CDS 0.001 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 
IK1 0.5 *** -0.01  0.006 ** 0.005  0.005  
VSTOXX 0.001  0.004 ** -0.002  0.0001  0.0001  
 
Robustness estimates with VSTOXX (b) 
 BD-bid BD-ask BD 
BC 9.32 *** 8.4 ** 8.9 *** 
OP -7.2  -2.4  -5.1  
FRISK -6.1 ** -34.9 * -47 * 
CDS -0.1 *** -0.1 *** -0.1 *** 
IK1 -1.3  -2.5 ** -1.9 * 






Robustness estimates with VSTOXX (c) 
 TD-bid TD-ask TD TV 
BC 33.9 *** 37.6 *** 35.8 *** 149.15 ** 
OP -39.7  -34.4  -36.1  30.19  
FRISK -91.7  -124 * -108  -31.21 * 
CDS -0.2 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.85 * 
IK1 -5.6 ** -6.63 ** -6.14 ** -28.62  
VSTOXX 0.23  0.31  0.27  7.34 ** 
Table 8 Robustness estimates with VSTOXX. The table shows the coefficients of Fixed Effect of the baseline 
regression (equation 46), by controlling also for market uncertainty (VSTOXX). The causal effect of the auction 
performance and of market conditions is estimated on fourteen liquidity measures: best bid-ask spread (BA), 
volume weighted bid-ask spread (VWBA), price impact of a deal of 20 million on the bid side (PI-bid), on the ask 
side (PI-ask) an on the total quoting book (PI), the best depth on the bid side of the market (BD-bid), on the ask 
side (BD-ask) and on their average (BD), on the depth of the total quoting book on the bid side (TD-bid), on the 
ask side (TD-ask) and on their average (TD), on the market trading volume (TV). The P-value of the F-test rejects 
always the null hypothesis that coefficients are not significant. * marks significance at 10%, ** marks significance 
at 5%, *** marks significance at 1%. 
The positive effect of the VSTOXX on market trading volume (TV), as shown in table 8 (c), is 
in line with Choi (2019). In a situation characterised by high volatility, investors are more 
uncertain about future market developments and have more dispersed beliefs. Therefore, around 
announcements, e.g. the disclosure of auction’s performance indicators, market makers increase 
their trades in BTPs. 
 
Conclusion 
Our empirical results emphasize the importance of auctions on efficiency of secondary market 
of Treasury bonds in terms of liquidity. As already documented by Beetsma et al. (2018), 
auction’s performance indicators as the bid-to-cover ratio have an impact on yield changes 
around auctions. In this work we explore the effect of these indicators on liquidity conditions 
on auctions day. Despite the wide use of the bid-to-cover ratio, this indicator is not always a 
good mean to describe the goodness of an auction. Consequently, we include in our empirical 
analysis another measure to define the goodness of an auction, i.e. the overpricing indicator.  
We develop a model that demonstrates how signals coming from auctions, i.e. the results affect 
market makers behaviour that translates into a more efficient liquidity provision in the 
secondary market, even though they have not perfect perception of the information received 
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from the issuance of new bonds. From the solution of our model, we derive empirically testable 
predictions. 
First, there is significant evidence that a good auction, in terms of bid-to-cover ratio and high 
overpricing, affects positively liquidity conditions on auctions day, i.e. the bid-ask spread, the 
volume-weighted bid-ask spread and the price impact of a deal of 20 million decline and depth 
and trading volumes grow.    
In addition, by comparing the liquidity measures related to the best quotes and to the total 
quoting book, market makers do not follow the same strategy, i.e. they quote at different prices. 
Furthermore, we found strong evidence that the two predictors are complementary to each 
other, i.e. the bid-to-cover ratio affects only quantity-related liquidity metrics and the 
overpricing indicator affects price-related quantities. Additionally, in special circumstances as 
in periods characterised by higher volatility, the overpricing indicator is more informative of a 
goodness of an auction as it has a significant impact also on other liquidity measures on auction 
day.  
Further research can be implemented in this framework. Instead of analysing a larger sample, 
future works could be conducted through an interaction between the indicators used and 
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ISIN codes of BTPs analysed 
 





IT0005139099 BTP 0,3% 15Ott18 01/01/2016 08/04/2016 
IT0005177271 BTP 0,1% 15Apr19 09/04/2016 10/10/2016 
IT0005217929 BTP 0,05% 15Ott19 11/10/2016 07/04/2017 
IT0005250946 BTP 0,35% 15Giu20 08/04/2017 09/10/2017 
IT0005285041 BTP 0,2% 15Ott20 10/10/2017 09/04/2018 
IT0005330961 BTP 0,05% 15Apr21 10/04/2018 08/10/2018 
IT0005348443 BTP 2,3% 15Ott21 09/10/2018 08/03/2019 
IT0005366007 BTP 1% 15Lug22 09/03/2019 09/09/2019 
IT0005384497 BTP 0,05% 15Gen23 10/09/2019 31/12/2019 
Table 1A 3-year BTP 
 





IT0005135840 BTP 1,45% 15Set22 01/01/2016 08/03/2016 
IT0005172322 BTP 0,95% 15Mar23 09/03/2016 08/09/2016 
IT0005215246 BTP 0,65% 15Ott23 09/09/2016 08/03/2017 
IT0005246340 BTP 1,85% 15Mag24 09/03/2017 08/09/2017 
IT0005282527 BTP 1,45% 15Nov24 09/09/2017 08/03/2018 
IT0005327306 BTP 1,45% 15Mag25 09/03/2018 10/09/2018 
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IT0005345183 BTP 2,5% 15Nov25 11/09/2018 08/04/2019 
IT0005370306 BTP 2,1% 15Lug26 09/04/2019 12/11/2019 
IT0005390874 BTP 0,85% 15Jan27 13/11/2019 31/12/2019 









IT0005127086 BTP 2% 01Dic25 01/01/2016 23/02/2016 
IT0005170839 BTP 1,6% 01Giu26 24/02/2016 25/07/2016 
IT0005210650 BTP 1,25% 01Dic26 26/07/2016 25/01/2017 
IT0005240830 BTP 2,20% 01Giu27 26/01/2017 27/06/2017 
IT0005274805 BTP 2,05% 01Ago27 28/06/2017 25/01/2018 
IT0005323032 BTP 2% 01Feb28 26/01/2018 25/07/2018 
IT0005340929 BTP 2,8% 01Dic28 26/07/2018 22/02/2019 
IT0005365165 BTP 3% 01Ago29 23/02/2019 26/08/2019 
IT0005383309 BTP 1,35% 01Apr30 27/08/2019 31/12/2019 
Table 3A 10-year BTP 
 
 
 
 
